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The Deep Structure of Imagination
Amy Bentley Lamborn, M.Div., PhD
“Imagination moves us to feel moved by something clearly within us 
that nonetheless is not us, that comes to us as an I and addresses us as 
a You.”1 
—Ann and Barry Ulanov
One of the major topics of Ann Ulanov’s work is that of the imagination, 
particularly the “life of the imaginary,” associated with the unconscious.  For Ula-
nov, following Jung, the unconscious is a creative matrix—a primordial wellspring 
from which conscious thinking flows and on which it depends.  This conscious, 
secondary-process thinking includes the various ways we think about human expe-
rience and “selfhood,” as well as the ways we think about God. 
Yet the imagination has not always fared so well in the postmodern era, in 
which there is a felt sense that the self has been dispersed, dissolved, and decon-
structed.  So what has happened to the human capacity to imagine?  Has the 
imagination also been dissolved?  
More than a few philosophers and cultural theorists have lamented the 
fate of the postmodern imagination.  They claim that the imagination has been 
stripped of its creative potential and referential depth; that it has been reduced 
to parody and mimicry, playing around on the surface of things. In his Wake of 
Imagination, for example, Richard Kearney analyzes the history of imagination 
from biblical and classical through medieval and Enlightenment paradigms.  He 
concludes that rather than pointing beyond themselves, postmodern images are 
simply proliferated in an endless play-of-mirrors, trapped in a chain of linguis-
tic signifiers, and incapable of being transcended by anything extra-imaginal or 
extra-textual.2 George Steiner tracks the seeming failure of the literary imagina-
tion.  “There is in words and sentences no pre-established affinity with objects,” he 
writes, “no mystery of consonance with the world. No figura of things. . . .”3 
I am not so willing to concede the death of imagination.  In fact, it is 
precisely that “mystery of consonance”—that “figura”—which I wish to attend. My 
claim is that even when it seems to stop, imagination nonetheless goes on.4 Even 
1 Ann and Barry Ulanov, The Healing Imagination (Einsiedeln, Switzerland:  Daimon 
Verlag, 1991), 37.
2 Richard Kearney, The Wake of the Imagination (Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis 
Press, 1988). 
3 George Steiner, Real Presences (London:  Faber and Faber, 1989), 105.
4 Kearney, Wake, 397.
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when it appears trapped in surface play, imagination hints at depths beyond itself.  
The negation of figuration is, after all, its own figurative endeavor.  
In this essay, then, I will develop my notion of the deep structure of imagi-
nation, making use of Kearney’s paradigmatic analysis of the imagination and by 
invoking an ancient term associated with depth and space, chora.  By the “deep 
structure of imagination,” I mean a dynamic capacity for organizing experience, 
perception, and meaning. This deep structure is a driving force in the emergence 
of the self.  It grounds and permeates all mental activity, including our construc-
tions of theory and theology. It is the point of contact between human experience 
and divine disclosure.  My aim is to provide a theoretical framework for entering 
more fully into the nature of imagination’s source, what Ulanov describes as that 
“presence” which is a part of us, yet not us; which moves within us, yet addresses 
us from beyond.5 
IMagInatIon:  a paradIgMatIc and dIalectIcal readIng 
What is imagination?  Etymology reveals a wide semantic array.  In Greek, 
imagination is rendered as both phantasia (fantasy) and eikasia (a mirroring/mir-
ror image); in Latin, imaginatio; in German, Einbildungskraft (fancy or vision) and 
Phantasie; in French (and English), imagination. Together, these several connota-
tions refer to what philosopher Mary Warnock describes as the function of an “as 
if” way of perceiving and experiencing. Imagination refers to the human ability to 
create mental images; to our proclivity for engaging in symbolic representation; to 
our image-making, capacity.6  
 We can trace this semantic breadth in the various understandings of imagi-
nation throughout history.  The ancient mind, for example, regarded the imagina-
tion solely as a receptive, reproductive faculty; what Kearney terms the mimetic 
imagination. In the biblical world—both Hebraic and Christian—and continuing 
through classical and medieval times, the “productions” of the imagination were 
regarded as mere copies of an external, transcendent reality. Only later, with the 
emergence of the Enlightenment and the “turn to the subject,” was the imagina-
tion understood as generative and creative in its own right, an independent and 
autonomous source of origination, what Kearney calls the productive imagination.  
Kearney claims that, following the Enlightenment, the image-making func-
tion of imagination has been in crisis. In an effort to develop an alternative to what 
he perceives as an active nihilism, in which we remain trapped in a labyrinth of an 
endless play of (non) meaning, he retrieves these past understandings of imagi-
nation and places them in a dialectical relationship with one another and with 
current trends. Ultimately, he proposes a new agenda for the postmodern imagi-
nation, one which is simultaneously ethical, critical, and poetic: ethical, because 
5 Ann and Barry Ulanov, The Healing Imagination (Einsiedeln, Switzerland:  Daimon 
Verlag, 1991), 37.
6 Mary Warnock, Imagination (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 10.
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instead of a parodic play-of-mirrors which denies any extra-imaginal “other,” our 
images must possess a certain regard for the claims of the other; critical, because 
there must always be a moment when we discern the obligation those claims hold 
for us; poetic, because the work of the imagination should always be playful and 
creative, offering something other than a deconstructive critique through parody 
and satire.
Kearney gathers up the ethical, the critical, and the poetic functions of his 
alternative paradigm into a provisional whole.  Rather than choosing between the 
premodern and modern forms of imagination, as if they presented us with either/
or alternatives, he suggests a postmodern approach that would integrate them.  
The ethical emphasis of the premodern would thus combine with the poetical em-
phasis of the modern. “A new alliance would be forged,” Kearney writes, “where 
the hidden or officially neglected dimensions of each paradigm (premodern and 
modern) might converge and breathe new life into an ostensibly dying imagina-
tion. . . .Here again we are reminded that the poetico-ethical imagination we are 
advancing is above all an empathic imagination.”7 Such a proposal for an alterna-
tive postmodern imagination is a daring exercise in the poetics of the possible, 
particularly in an intellectual and cultural milieu that increasingly insists on the 
impossibility of meaning. 
It is difficult to envision what could be more hopeful, in our present context, 
than the empathic imagination Kearney commends. Still, I wonder if Kearney’s 
alternative and visionary model of a “new alliance” might too much resemble its 
constituent parts.  What I want to keep open, here, is the possibility of the emer-
gence of something new which is more than the proverbial sum of its parts; some-
thing, indeed, which cannot be predicted from the fragments that a hermeneutical 
retrieval might assemble for us. 
Kearney, himself, seems ultimately to be in pursuit of the new that resides 
both within and beyond a poetics of the possible. Towards the end of his project, 
he admits that the imagination will always be in crisis, for its representational 
capabilities—whether mimetic, productive, or parodic—remain inevitably limited. 
“This is why we feel bound to continue the search for a postmodern imagination,” 
Kearney writes, “one willing to accept that whatever particular narrative it chooses 
or whatever image it constructs, there is always some dimension of otherness 
which transcends it.”8  
Invoking the dimension of otherness gives rise to a number of challenging 
and critical questions. What is the “otherness” of this other? Where does it reside? 
What is its source, its logic, its name?  What is its connection to that space where 
the imagination performs its transgressive function, crisscrossing the boundaries 





One way to approach such questions about otherness is with the notion of 
space—a space that is, itself, bordered by all manner of opposites. Here I take up 
an ancient term for this kind of space, that of chora.  Chora has become something 
of a preoccupation for a number of postmodern thinkers.  But its origins are decid-
edly premodern.  As a philosophical term, chora first appeared in Plato’s dialogue 
Timaeus.  In this late dialogue, Plato revisits the “big picture” of this entire philo-
sophical system. So he considers the eternal and unchanging Forms, which can be 
the object of our knowing, and the changing objects of the world of sense, which 
exist as mere Copies of the unchanging Forms. 
Plato concluded that Forms and their Copies, alone, could not fully account 
for the inventory of the world.  So he asks one of the greatest, most fundamental 
of all questions: What is the primordial source of all that exists; of all things that 
come to be?  After struggling to identify the fundamental conditions for the pos-
sibility of being, and a world of being, Plato argues for a third type (triton genos), a 
category distinct from both Form and Copies. Chora is the name Plato gives this 
third thing, this mysterious source of being, this other.9 
Chora can mean a variety of things in Greek, including mother, a receptacle, 
a womb, nurse, a base material for the making of perfume, and a winnowing sieve 
used in the bread-making process. Common to each of these associations is the 
idea of a matrix, that which contains the possibility of emergence and the actuality 
of becoming. Plato uses this term to refer to a certain quality of space.  A placeless 
space, in fact, from which everything that is comes to be. For Plato this allusive 
and virtually untranslatable concept fundamentally challenges our usual catego-
ries of rationality. He suggested that chora is perhaps best apprehended through a 
dream-like state of consciousness, something akin to reverie or imagination.10  
In his commentary on Timaeus, John Sallis celebrates this ability of chora to 
challenge rational logic. And he cautions against any attempt to explain the term. 
Indeed, Sallis’ dreamy prose has the effect of pushing the reader to the edges of 
rationality and evoking the imaginative, dream-like consciousness Plato com-
mended. “By insisting on a reading of the chorology in which the meaning of the 
Χόρα [chora] would come to be determined,” he writes, “the resulting interpreta-
tions produced a reduction of the χόρα, situating it within a horizon of sense that 
it would otherwise both limit and escape, effacing its distinctiveness in the very 
gesture of interpretation, in the very demand that the chorology make sense, in the 
refusal to read in it, instead, a limiting of both making and sense.”11
In my mind, this kind of hermeneutical refusal places chora in the dreamy 
proximity of the unpronounceable YHWH, the Hebrew name for the Holy One, 
which—by divine decree—refuses the limitation that would accompany its utter-
9 Plato. Timaeus 52a–b, trans. Donald J. Zeyl (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1997), 1255.
10 Kearney, Strangers, 152.
11 John Sallis, Chorology (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 4.
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ance.12  But such a placement of chora is just that—proximate. Lingering for a time 
in our dream-like consciousness we might ask:  do all interpretative gestures that 
attempt to situate chora within a horizon of sense necessarily efface its distinctive-
ness? Rather than hermeneutical refusal, might it be that a certain hermeneutical 
transgression into a horizon of sense would honor the phenomenon of meaning’s 
excess while also compounding that excess? 
parallels FroM psychoanalysIs: d. W. WInnIcott and carl jung
Winnicott’s idea of potential space is an example of what such an interpre-
tive transgression might yield.  Potential space is the space between inner reality 
and external life, between the subjective and that which is objectively perceived.  
Much like Plato, who believed the world consists of more than Forms and Copies, 
Winnicott insisted that psychic life consists of more than inner and outer reality. 
And, like the ancient philosopher summoning his triton genos, Winnicott similarly 
invoked a third term, an intermediate area, a space which is neither inner nor outer, 
but to which inner and outer both contribute. 
It is in this potential space, which first obtains between the infant and 
the mother/mothering one, that the first “not-me” experience is facilitated and 
contained; that the initial encounter with otherness is symbolized.13 It is in this 
placeless space, this matrix of becoming, that the capacity for imagination and 
the recognition of otherness emerge, developing in tandem. Here we can observe 
the connections between imagination, space, and otherness.  Transitional space 
is the mental space we associate with imagination.  And Winnicott’s theory of 
transitional phenomena is a psychoanalytic theory of the origins of the human 
capacity to imagine. Moreover, the implication of Winnicott’s thinking about the 
intermediate area of experience is that the capacity to imagine can only emerge 
in the interaction between persons.  It simply cannot develop in isolation, within 
the infant’s own mind. Winnicott’s is an intersubjective theory for the origin 
of symbolic imagination.14 The origins of imagination are necessarily bound up 
with otherness.
Potential space and transitional phenomena link with Jung’s notion of the 
mediation of the opposites, the coniunctio between inner and outer, subject and ob-
12 Kearney suggests that the “nameless name” of chora functions as a kind of “Hellenic 
obverse” to Exodus 3:15 (“God also said to Moses, ‘Thus you shall say to the Israelites, ‘The Lord, the 
God of your ancestors, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob, has sent me to 
you.’ This is my name forever, and this is my title for all generations.”  See Strangers, 193.
13 See, for example, Winnicott’s Playing and Reality (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 
1971/2002).
14 Warren Colman, “Symbolic Conceptions: The Idea of the Third,” Journal of Analytical 
Psychology 52 (2007): 570.
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ject, conscious and unconscious.15 Indeed, for Jung it is imagination that provides 
the unifying function resulting from such mediation. Imagination facilitates our 
reckonings with otherness, represented by the other (unconscious) point of de-
parture or other point of view—spirited reckonings which ultimately yield a third 
term, a third function, a third space. 
This thirdness, what Jung termed the transcendent function, emerges from 
a dialogical confrontation between ego and Self. Here, the ego and the contents 
of the unconscious relate as “other” to one another, each taking its own stand 
and having its own say. And the space of conversation, which gradually opens 
up between them, becomes a matrix for a new attitude, a new symbol, a new 
ordering of reality, and a new embrace of aliveness.16 Imagination and otherness 
are inextricably bound throughout this process, but only up to a point. Together, 
they usher us to the edge of our knowing and perceiving, pointing ultimately to 
a realm beyond our imagining. The meaning of the union of opposites stands out-
side of our capacity to imagine it, because in that union we encounter an eternal, 
archetypal image.17  
Whatever narrative imagination chooses or whatever image it constructs, there 
is always some dimension of otherness that transcends it. For Jung, this dimension of 
otherness includes the realm of the eternal and archetypal, where images are not so 
much constructed as given; not so much created as received. It is this dimension of 
otherness that presses any search for an alternative postmodern imagination. And 
it is this realm that offers us that “something” which cannot be predicted from the 
fragments that any hermeneutical retrieval might assemble for us. However hope-
ful the empathic imagination—versatile, open-minded, prepared for its encounter 
with the other—we cannot do without a certain pressing beyond our horizons of 
meaning and sense.  It is through that pressing beyond that our reach continually 
exceeds our grasp.
the deep structure oF IMagInatIon
Further developing my notion of imagination’s deep structure, I return to 
chora, a kind of conceptual plaything for a number of postmodern thinkers.  Der-
rida, in what was perhaps the most noteworthy move, seized on the elusive spatial-
ity of Plato’s chora, appropriating it as a kind of next-of-kin for his (non)notion of 
15 See, for example, C. G. Jung, “Psychological Commentary on the Tibetan Book of 
Great Liberation,” in Psychology and Religion: West and East, vol. 11 of Collected Works (New York:  
Bollingen, 1954);  C. G. Jung  “On the Nature of the Psyche,” in Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 
vol. 8 of Collected Works (New York:  Bollingen, 1960).  
16 Ann Belford Ulanov, “The Third in the Shadow of the Fourth,” Journal of Analytical 
Psychology 52 (2007): 589–90.
17 C. G. Jung, Mysterium Coniunctionis, trans. R. F. C. Hull, in vol. 14 of Collected Works 
(New York: Bollingen, 1963), p. 167.
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différance.18 Chora, for Derrida, is the abyssal chasm, the formless matter of form.19  
Through the play of postmodern permutation, chora has come to suggest both 
space and depth:  a deep space, a bottomless yawn, an anti-matrix . . . signifying 
nothing. The Deep has become deeply suspect.
Postmodernism, which (consciously) loathes binary thinking, has (uncon-
sciously) constructed a new binary from its deconstructive ruins: the given (origins 
in [sacred] depth) versus the made (beginnings in [secular] surface).20 By introduc-
ing the concept of the deep structure of fantasy, I continue in a counter-cultural 
way. Here I am for a deconstruction of this binary; or to use Jungian terms, to 
serve an imaginative transcendence of the binary—a mediation of the opposites. 
Deep structure, as I envision it, encompasses both the given and the made. Far from 
being a vacuous abyss, it is here envisioned as a generative space; a matrix for all 
becoming; a place of encounter with transcendence itself.
orIgIns and extensIons oF deep structure
The term deep structure originated in the field of linguistics through the 
work of Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomksy. Saussure believed that the 
organization of human language is not random, but rather structured in regular, 
non-arbitrary, and rule-governed ways.  Assuming normal capacity and develop-
ment, human beings are capable of using language according to an unconscious 
set of rules—the “depth grammar” of language. Chomsky referred to this innate 
capacity for the linguistic representation of perception and experience as the deep 
structure of language. 
The notion of deep structure quickly moved beyond the field of linguistics, 
and it continues to be used across a variety of disciplines. Some theologians, for ex-
ample, have extended the notion of deep structure/depth grammar to describe the 
phenomenon and function of religious doctrine. Daniel Migliore uses the concept 
to advance theology’s hermeneutical task. He believes that, when attempting to in-
terpret doctrine, the work of theology is to discover “the ‘depth grammar’ that lies 
18 Chora is one of Derrida’s many “nonsynonymous substitutions” for différance (others 
include trace, supplement, infinity, etc).  Différance is, itself, a French neologism coined by Derrida 
that plays on the dual meanings of the French word différer (to differ and to defer).  Différance hints 
at a cluster of features which, according to Derrida, determine the production of textual meaning.  
Derrida claimed, for example, that words and signs can never by themselves fully convey what they 
mean, but rather rely on other words from which they differ (hence Derrida’s insistence on the deferral 
of meaning   through an endless chain of signifiers).  Derrida also focused on the difference between 
words by force of space—a force that differentiates linguistic elements from one another resulting in 
hierarchies and binary oppositions which further undermine the possibility of meaning.
19 See Jacques Derrida, “Khora,” in On the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit; trans. Ian McLeod. 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1995).
20 Catherine Keller, The Face of the Deep:  A Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 
2003), 166–67.
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beneath all the ‘surface grammar’ and all of the particular, and always inadequate, 
names and images that we employ when we speak of the God of the gospel.”21  
Theologian George Lindbeck employs the term to highlight what he regards 
as the performative nature of doctrine. He argues that religion is best understood 
as a linguistic medium that organizes and shapes all life and thought. Religious 
doctrine, according to Lindbeck, possesses its own unique logic or grammar, 
including a distinct vocabulary of symbols, both discursive and nondiscursive, that 
can be meaningfully engaged.   Doctrine, for Lindbeck, is an idiom that makes it 
possible for us to describe the realities, to formulate our beliefs, and to experience  
inner feelings and responses.22  
Several psychoanalytic theorists have also extended the notion of deep 
structure into the domain of psychoanalytic discourse. Christopher Bollas identi-
fies “deep structure” as the “grammar of the ego.”23 This deep structure is formed 
by the infant’s internalization of the mother’s “idiom of care,” an intricate and 
unconscious network of rules for processing intrapsychic and intersubjective life, 
for being and experiencing.24 
Thomas Ogden envisions a “psychological deep structure” that consists 
of innate bodily impulses and their corresponding fantasies.25 Here deep struc-
ture is an instinctual, body-based form of knowing.  Emmanuel Ghent writes of 
“biologically organized templates and delimiters” that provide the constraints 
within which interpersonal experience unfolds.26  Edgar Levenson associates deep 
structure with “the centrality of metaphor” and “the mysterious terra incognita of 
the mind.”27 
deep structure and the archetype
While the actual term deep structure does not appear in Jung’s work, the 
concept is nonetheless implicit in his theory of the archetypes.  This theory origi-
nated in Jung’s own self-analysis and from his extensive work with patients suffer-
ing from psychosis. What Jung observed is that the imaginal material that mani-
fested in these contexts had no apparent connection to memories, perceptions, or 
21 Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 64.
22 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1984), 33.
23 See, for example, The Shadow of the Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1987), 72; Forces of Destiny (London:  Free Association Books, 1989), 195.
24 Bollas, Forces of Destiny, 195.
25 Thomas Ogden, The Matrix of the Mind (Oxford, UK:  Rowman & Littlefield, 1990), 13–15.
26 Emmanuel Ghent, “Credo—the Dialectics of One-Person and Two-Person Psychologies,” 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis 25 (1989): 179.
27 Edgar A. Levenson, “Politics of Interpretation,” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 32, no. 4 
(1996): 647.
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conscious experiences. He also noted that these images fell into discernible patterns 
and echoed motifs found in myths and religious symbols, and fairy tales. 
Through his analysis of such material, Jung concluded that such images 
are universal modes of behavior and experience, serving as a kind of foundation 
from which all subsequent imagery derives. Beginning in 1912, Jung termed 
these images as primordial images.  And he continued to use that term despite 
subsequent modifications in his thinking.  Jung believed that no theory of 
cultural migration could explain the ubiquity of certain motifs, and this led him 
to conclude that there is a part of the psyche held in common and he called this 
the collective unconscious.28
In 1917 Jung introduced the term dominants in his discussions of the collec-
tive unconscious, referring to certain nodal points around which images cluster. 
Analyzing this shift in terminology, Samuels concludes that the notion of an in-
nate structure became the more powerful component of the theory. The concept of 
pre-existing structure appears to take precedence over subjective experience.
When Jung introduced the term archetype in 1919, he continued to empha-
size the concept of an innate, inherited structure. But the notion of inheritance, 
Jung argued, referred to form and pattern rather than content. Jung saw the arche-
type as a purely formal, empty concept, one that is later filled out with imagery, 
motifs, ideas, etc. from particular cultural, historical, and biographical contexts.29 
This relationship of archetype to environment functions as a kind of “feedback 
system”: experiences that are repeated leave residues in the psyche that eventually 
become archetypal structures. And these structures, in turn, influence experience, 
organizing it in terms of preexisting patterns.30
However much Jung’s theory of the archetype evolved, one component of 
the theory that persists is the linking of archetypes with instinct. Early on, Jung 
described the primordial image or archetype as “the instinct’s perception of itself 
. . . the self-portrait of the instinct . . . .”31 As Jung’s later writings about the con-
nection between instinct and image attest, the metaphor of self-portraiture is best 
envisioned as a vibrant and interpenetrating dynamism rather than a static entity. 
“The realization and assimilation of instinct never take place . . . by absorption 
into the instinctual sphere,” Jung wrote, “but only through integration of the im-
age which signifies and evokes the instinct.”32  Instinct and image, according to 
Jung, share a mutual, interdependent relationship. 
28 Andrew Samuels, “The Theory of Archetypes in Jungian and Post-Jungian Analytical 
Psychology,” The International Review of Psycho-Analysis 10 (1983): 429.
29 Ibid., 430.
30 Ibid., 431.
31 Jung. C. G., “Instinct and the Unconscious,” in The Structure and Dynamics of the Psyche, 
vol. 8 of Collected Works (New York: Bollingen, 1960), p. 146.
32 Jung. C. G., “A Review of the Complex Theory,” in The Structure and Dynamics of the 
Psyche, vol. 8 of Collected Works (New York: Bollingen, 1960), p. 211.
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deep structure: a WorkIng notIon  
Together, these renderings of deep structure attest that we are dealing with 
a multifaceted concept.  Deep structure variously suggests the sense of something 
core or essential, surrounded by names and images that are always inadequate; a 
shared idiom that makes possible a range of practices, beliefs, and experiences; the 
dim recognition of the ego’s silent grammar that risks expression in the mysteri-
ous glossolalia of the primary speech of the unconscious; the interdependence of 
instinct and image; innate schema which influence, and are influenced by, experi-
ence and environment.
What, then, does an adequate conceptualization of the deep structure of 
fantasy require? Not, I think a narrow choosing; a sifting and sorting; a precise 
selection of one domain of meaning over another. Deep structure is a both/and 
concept, itself multiple in its meaning. What I prefer, then, is to sustain the work 
of interpretive transgression:  lingering with these several tropes of deep structure; 
honoring the phenomenon of meaning’s excess; and hoping, in the process, to 
compound that excess.
The deep structure of imagination thus encompasses a number of descrip-
tors. It is embodied, admitting the dynamic link between instinct and image. It 
is relational, honoring the interplay between intrapsychic life and intersubjective 
experience—between being and experiencing. It is subject to modification, open to 
the influence from the environmental surround. It is given, claiming and receiving 
its inheritance with gratitude for what has come before and what lies beyond. And, 
as a steward of its inheritance, it is performative and creative, a spacious matrix for 
the emergence of the new.
In thinking about deep structure in these ways, I am helped by coming back 
to chora.  Indeed, invoking such notions as space and depth mean dealing with the 
postmodernist and poststructuralist suspicion of the Deep. Depth, having been 
implicated in the quest for universal and explanatory origins, has been equated 
with homogenization and colonization.33 The Deep has thus been rendered a post-
modern and poststructuralist impossibility. Yet this impossibility of depth is para-
33 Post-colonial theorist Homi Bhabha, for example, blames the “dimension of depth” for 
“the language of Identity with its sense of reality—a measure of the ‘me,’ which emerges from an 
acknowledgement of my inwardness, the depth of my character, the profundity of my person, to 
mention only a few of those qualities through which we commonly articulate our self-consciousness.”  
See The Location of Culture (New York:  Routledge, 1994/1997), 48ff.  Building on Bhabha’s critique 
and ultimately betraying, I think, the trajectory of her otherwise creative hermeneutic of depth, 
Catherine Keller notes that the notion of the “vertical dimension” of depth “functions as the very 
medium of homogenization, the solvent of difference—the stabilizing site of the ‘before that.” See 
Face of the Deep (New York:  Routledge, 1993), 161.  In terms of the “dimension of depth” evoked 
by the depth psychologies, I would argue that the “solvent of difference” can produce a sense of 
commonality and solidarity (kinship) without resulting in a de facto homogenization.  As Ann Ulanov 
often puts it, the reality of the unconscious suggests that while we do not share the same inner life, we 
share the same kind of inner life. (Personal communication)
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doxical. For example, while many postmodern thinkers critique or reject notions 
of “deep” or “nonsocial subjectivity,” they also, unwittingly, presuppose it.  As Jane 
Flax has observed, “The capacity for aesthetic or mystical experience (Lyotard, 
Derrida, Foucault), the ability to utter new and interesting sentences (Rorty), and 
the will to resist totalizing discourses (Foucault),” according to Flax, “all require a 
‘deep’ subjectivity.”34 
Theologian Catherine Keller, who is committed to the poststructural-
ist project, has proposed a constructive theology of the deep, what she terms a 
“tehomic theology.”35 “Tehomic” plays off the Hebrew word tehom, meaning the 
deep; a watery chaos; depth itself: “In the beginning when God created the heavens 
and the earth, the earth was a formless void and darkness covered the face of the 
deep, while a wind from God swept over the face of the waters.”36 Tehom shares an 
associative link with chora. 
Keller points out that, at times, Derrida wanted to keep chora distinct from 
chaos, as if anxiously protecting it from a kind of theoretical contamination. By 
keeping chora devoid even of chaos, Derrida hoped to maintain it as an empty 
space, an abyssal chasm, an anti-matrix that precludes the signification of mean-
ing.37 Through a creative exegesis of both tehom and Derrida, Keller reclaims the 
ancient sense of chora as a matrix for becoming a generative space. Keller’s theol-
ogy of the deep is an attempt at her own poetics of the possible: “For a tehomic 
discourse,” she writes, “it is only as . . . a matrix of possibility that chaos becomes 
depth. But this Deep . . . has little to do with the homogenizing verticalities and 
interiorities of the depth that come opposed to surface.” As fluid chaos, chora is not 
a homogenizing or totalizing space. In the phrase, the face of the deep, the would-
be binary of “surface” and “depth” is transcended.  
chaos, ForMlessness, and eMergence
Chora/tehom is further intensified by another Hebrew term, tohu vabohu, 
which may be translated as “formlessness” and/or “normlessness.” Tohu vabohu 
is tehom’s linguistic “near neighbor” in the opening verses of Genesis: “the earth 
was a formless void,” the text tells us, “and darkness covered the face of the deep.” 
Tohu vabohu, much like chora, is a womb-like space for becoming; a kind of prima 
materia, or base element for the making of a prized substance.  
The idea of a formless, normless, fluid chaos—a kind of “nothing-some-
thing”—has worked its way into the language of science, primarily through chaos 
theory and the generative/emergence theories.38 Such constructs provide alternate 
accounts of the ordering of chaos.  They see order as that which arises spontane-
34 Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 210.
35 Catherine Keller, Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 1993).
36 Gen1:1–2.
37 Keller, Face of the Deep, 166.
38 Keller, Face of the Deep, 186.
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ously out of chaos. Processes of self-regulation and self-organization preside over 
such an ordering process. Physicists Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, for 
example, claim that processes of self-organization  in conditions characterized by 
heightened disequilibrium evoke a subtle interplay between chance and necessity, 
random fluctuations and deterministic physical laws.39 Fluctuation indicates both 
the repetitive and transgressive, processes that comprise chaos and those which 
generate order.40 
Emergence theory is one way of accounting for novelty, a newness that 
cannot be predicted by or reduced to its constituent elements.41 Such novelty is 
dependent on otherness and beyondness.  As a descriptor of the deep structure of 
imagination, emergence functions as a third term that transcends both the given 
(depth) and the made (surface).
deep structure, IMagInatIon, and the selF  
Some contemporary psychoanalytic theories of imagination, which attempt 
to explore its creative function, offer a partial grounding for my claim. Any study 
of fantasy must attempt to address the extent to which fantasies contribute to our 
construction of reality.42 Imagination appears to be both a product of reality as 
well as have far-reaching consequences for what will become reality.43 Assuming 
such consequences, what are the implications for imagination for the ways we 
shape reality, including the reality some persist in calling the self?  If we regard the 
self as a kind of imaginative construct, what becomes of our notions of selfhood 
and identity that depend upon certain notions of creation or givenness?   
In considering such fundamental questions concerning the relationship 
between fantasy and the self ’s emergence, I return to the hermeneutic of trans-
gression used to illuminate the concept of deep structure. Making use of this 
hermeneutic, I allow the several tropes of the deep structure to co-exist. Taken 
together, these several tropes—both mimetic (receptive) and productive (genera-
tive) in form—point toward an element of otherness; to a certain “beyondness;” 
to a mystery that pervades our figura of things, including the construct of the self. 
Recalling Kearney’s empathic imagination, I acknowledge that some dimension of 
otherness always transcends whatever narrative the imagination chooses; whatever 
image it constructs.44  
39 Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, Order Out of Chaos (New York:  Bantom, 1984), 176.
40 My (playful) allusion, here, is to Deleuze’s assertion that “In every respect, repetition is a 
form of transgression.” See Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1994), 3.
41 Colman, “Symbolic Conceptions,” 566.




Theological anthropology, having entered a constructive dialogue with 
postmodern theory, must demonstrate how human existence lodges in the space 
between creation and construction.45 The task of theology is to interpret the world 
and the contemporary situation from a point of view that says there is more to 
life than arbitrary and social construction. Something given grounds any human 
construction, something that expresses itself as creation.46  
By the emergence of the self, I acknowledge both the reality and ubiquity 
of human construction and honor an otherness that resides simultaneously within 
and beyond the confines of such construction. Even if we could finally deconstruct 
the self by stripping away the various discourses and discursive practices that have 
produced our identities, we would still encounter a certain givenness—traces of 
creation. When the various components of selfhood are gathered and assembled, 
the sense that there is something more persists.  
This something more is the Other. 
Even that which appears as an otherwise arbitrary human construction can, 
itself, be expressive of creation—of something given. The Other announces itself 
through the very confines of human construction. Theologically, the divine Other 
responds to our imaginings and constructions.  God is even revealed in them and 
often embodies them.47 Such is the Eucharistic presence of Christ in bread and 
wine, elements made by human labor.
The emergence of the self, then, evokes a sense of the self as, itself, an 
emergent phenomenon, something that cannot be predicted by or reduced to its 
constituent elements. Despite the differences in terminology, the following words 
of Jung come to mind. “Personality,” he writes, “is the supreme realization of the 
innate idiosyncrasy of a living being.  It is an act of high courage flung in the face 
of life, the absolute affirmation of all that constitutes the individual, the most 
successful adaptation to the universal conditions of existence coupled with the 
greatest possible freedom for self-determination.”48 
When we view the self as an emergent, we glimpse a structure that tran-
scends the “given” (inherited) and the “made” (constructed), and our greatest pos-
sible freedom for self-determination becomes its own poesis.  It is in the potential 
space between the symbol and the symbolized that a subjectivity, itself, comes to 
be.49 And it is in the chora between the symbol and the symbolized that an imagi-
native and imagining self comes into being. 
45 Jan-Olav Henriksen, “Creation and Construction: On the Theological Appropriation of 
Postmodern Theory,” Modern Theology 18, no. 2 (April 2002): 167.
46 Ibid., 157–58.
47 Laurel C. Schneider, Beyond Monotheism: A Theology of Multiplicity (New York: Routledge, 
2008), 12.
48 Carl G. Jung, The Development of Personality (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 
1954), p. 171.
49 Thomas Ogden, The Primitive Edge of Experience (New York:  Jason Aronson, 1989), 12.
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IMagInIng theory, IMagInIng theology
In Faith and the Play of Imagination, theologian David Bryant attends to 
the complexities of the relationship between “creation” and “construction” and to 
the space between the symbol and the symbolized.  Ultimately, he develops what I 
characterize as an inter-subjective theology of the imagination.  “Before we begin 
in a conscious way to conceive the world imaginatively, he writes, “we are already 
rooted in an imaginative world of meaning through which the world is medi-
ated to us. And what is thereby opened to us is pivotal for all our more conscious 
imaginative efforts. Hence, even our creative efforts are not altogether our own 
personal construction but arise out of the creative power of the tradition to which 
we belong.”50   He regards the imagination as something that is personal, but also 
transpersonal. “[To] the degree that conceptual frameworks uncover a world, and 
are not just the subjective creations of communities or individuals, the imagination 
is not merely a human power of construction or projection. It could . . . be defined 
in this case as a power of attunement that is finally located in neither subject nor 
subject matter but in the play between them.”51  
Embedded in Bryant’s provocative prose are several interwoven threads 
of meaning that, taken together, undergird a non-reductive approach to what it 
means to imagine theology and imagine theory. What Bryant highlights here is 
our dependence on images. Such imaginal dependence paradoxically both precedes 
and promotes our imaginal capacity. Dependence links with our relationship to 
tradition, to that which is there, awaiting our discovery. So, while I might properly 
designate my imagination as mine, something which I possess and something out 
of which I create, it really is not simply my own. 
Winnicott articulated a similar notion from a psychological point of view. 
Potential space, beyond infancy, becomes the area we link with culture. Winnicott 
claimed that with any cultural endeavor, originality necessarily makes use of tradi-
tion.52 In any imaginative act, the line between what is “me,” as in “my idea” and 
“not-me,” or “another’s idea” is blurry. As Winnicott put it, “the interplay between 
originality and the acceptance of tradition as the basis for inventiveness seems 
to me to be just one more example . . . of the interplay between separateness and 
union.”53 The interplay of the one and the many thus underlies our very capacity 
for imagining.
Related to this notion of a personal imagination being already rooted in 
tradition is the concept of mediation. Ideas and concepts lead to the uncovering of 
bigger worlds. Images are not ultimately self-referential. They lead us somewhere, 
beyond themselves, and toward a larger horizon of meaning. Otherness is bound 
50 David Bryant, Faith and the Play of Imagination: On the Role of Imagination in Religion 
(Macon, GA: Mercer, 1987), 104.
51 Ibid. 
52 Winnicott, Playing and Reality, 101.
53 Ibid.
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up with images—an otherness that calls into question any attempt at subjective 
reductionism. This otherness also offers us ways of conceptualizing the empathic 
imagination—an imagination that admits that meaning does not emerge merely 
within the echo chambers of its own subjective experience.  It originates just as 
much from its response to the Other’s evocation.54   
Imagination is not reality’s opposite, but rather the organ with which we 
perceive the many and various frameworks of reality and illusion alike.55 The truth 
the deep structure of imagination yields is not merely subjective, reducible to tran-
sient human fantasies and constructs. Not when we respond to the otherness that 
is both within us and and beyond us. Imagining empathically, our reach always 
exceeds our grasp, and we encounter the ineffable.
deep structure, the unconscIous, and god
How then do we accomplish an imaginative transcendence of the post-
modern binary:  the given (origins in [sacred] depth] versus the made (beginnings 
in [secular] surface)?  In spite of the postmodern suspicion of both depth and 
structure, we have conceived of a kind of deep structure that can encompass both 
the given (creation) and the made (construction). Instead of a vacuous abyss, this 
chora depth is a generative space; a matrix for emergence and becoming; a place 
in which we may encounter something ineffable and ultimate, a numinous and 
sacred presence.
Kearney observes that, before the advent of the postmodern parodic circle—
a kind of “open-ended play of signifiers” where images are no longer regarded as 
referring to some original, “real” (external) meaning—thinking about the imagi-
nation always included the notion of origination, that our images derive from some 
original presence.56 In the paradigm of the mimetic imagination, dominant in the 
biblical, classical, and medieval eras, this original presence is understood as being 
located outside the human subject. By contrast, in the paradigm of the productive 
imagination, heralded by modern philosophies of idealism and existentialism, the 
location of creative origination was situated within the human subject.57
We have met with this original presence in terms of givenness, beyondness, 
and otherness. This otherness simultaneously resides both beyond and within, yet 
performs its transgressive work in the potential, in-between space. There it criss-
crosses the boundaries between the unreal and the real, inner and outer, subject 
and object, me and not-me. But what is the relationship of this “original pres-
ence”—within, beyond, in-between—with the presence of the sacred? Michelan-
54 Kearney, Wake, 387.





gelo’s “The Creation of Adam” helps. This image portrays God and Adam reaching 
toward one another, their fingers almost touching, but not quite. The gap between 
creature and Creator, the space between them, is the focal point of the painting.  It 
is this gap—this space—that suggests both an overlapping desire for contact and 
intimacy and the fact of difference, for unity and separateness.
This space is the space of imagination, the space of commerce between the 
human and divine realms. In Imagining God, Graham Green says that this space 
of commerce, this point of contact, permits us to admit the priority of God’s grace 
in the divine-human re-encounter, while simultaneously allowing the dynamics of 
grace to be described as a religious phenomenon.58 Such descriptive processes im-
ply a reciprocity between divine disclosure and human experience, including that 
experience which transpires in the unconscious depths. “One deep calls to another 
in the noise of your cataracts;” the psalmist writes; “all your rapids and floods have 
gone over me.”59  The ineffable approaches us, draws near to us, as “transcendence 
in the midst.”60  
Deep structure, the unconscious, and God converge in this space of com-
merce between the human and the divine.  But they also diverge there.  The 
seventeenth-century mystic Angelus Silesius intimates the play of convergence and 
divergence: The abyss that is my soul invokes unceasingly / The abyss that is my God.  
Which may the deeper be?61 The call of voices, deep to deep, is a “tehomic liturgy” 
marking the depth at which we imagine the self ’s bottoming-out. Catherine 
Keller describes Silesius’ tehomic liturgy, as “an ambiguous, far-from-equilibrium 
self-similarity: the interfluency of ‘my soul’ and ‘my God,’ in their utter difference 
and mirror-play.”62  
Within the chora we hear an “abyssal echo” of refrain and response and 
encounter, there, the play of sameness and difference, of unity and multiplic-
ity. “Khora is neither identical with God nor incompatible with God,” Kearney 
suggest, “but marks an open site where the divine may dwell and heal.”63  Here 
58 Garrett Green, Imagining God: Theology and the Religious Imagination (San Francisco:  
Harper, 1989), 4.
59 Psalm 42:9.
60 Green, Imagining God, 8.
61 Angelus Silesius, The Cherubinic Wanderer (Mahwah, NY:  Paulist, 1986), 42.
62 Keller, Face, 216.
63 Kearney, Strangers, 194.  Kearney’s distinct “take” on chora follows from his exploration 
and critique of the “exfoliation of metaphors” used to illuminate it (in philosophical, theological, 
psychoanalytic literature).  He writes:  “There appear to be three ways in which khora may be related 
to God:  (1) as undecidable and neutral quasi-condition of both theism and atheism; (2) as the 
atheistic ‘real’ which is pre-originary and prior to theistic figuration; and (3) as proto-theistic quasi-
condition of faith in messianic justice and a kingdom of democracy to come.  The three readings 
might be summarized as khora-open-to-God (neither for not against); khora-against-God and khora-for-
God.” (See note 21, p. 283).  
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we observe the “abyssal movement” of convergence and divergence: of the Deus 
absconditus, the God hidden within and, yet, beyond the depths of the psyche. The 
ruach of the infinite breathes its deep sighs through the deep structure of those 
imaginative constructs we call theory and theology.  
As we listen to its murmurings, we may hear that which addresses us from 
beyond.
